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BURDEN SHARING IN THE PERSIAN GULF: LESSONS LEARNED AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
ABSTRACT
The United States was the dominant member of the coalition formed to
counter Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. This lead to U.S. concerns that
countries benefiting from the coalition were contributing less than their fair
share. This paper compares contributions and benefits for the major coalition
participants in Operation Desert Storm. Benefits include national sovereignty
and oil supply security. Contributions include defense resources and
financial and in-kind payments to the U.S. and other countries.
The analysis concludes that national sovereignty was the more
significant of the two benefits and that the oil supply security benefit may
be larger for the U.S. than for countries completely dependent on imported oil
(i.e., Japan and Germany). Thus, the Gulf countries may have under-
contributed to the coalition. Japan and Germany may have over-contributed
relative to these benefits, though they may have received other benefits not
measured here.

BURDEN SHARING IN THE PERSIAN GULF: LESSONS LEARNED AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Katsuaki L. Terasawa and William R. Gates*
INTRODUCTION
Early on August 2, 1990, the armed forces of Iraq invaded and later
annexed Kuwait. This increased Iraq's oil res'ources from 15% to 20% of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) annual output and
increased Iraq's proven reserves from 13% to 25% of OPEC ' s proven reserves.
(Fortune, 1990) Iraq maintained the world's fourth largest military force.
Iraq's combined economic and military power enabled them to become a dominant
force in the Persian Gulf. Considering that Saddam Hussein, Iraq's leader,
had visions of reuniting the Arab population and challenging Israel's
existence (Nonneman, 1990), Iraq threatened it's Arab neighbors and the
regional power balance.
A multinational coalition was established to counter the Iraqi threat.
Backed by 12 United Nations (UN) resolutions (Neff, 1990), the coalition
sought Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Initially, the coalition
relied on economic sanctions and diplomatic negotiation. The UN set a January
15, 1991 deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. On January 16, when
sanctions and diplomacy had not succeeded, the multinational coalition turned
to military force in an effort dubbed "Operation Desert Storm."
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. This work was sponsored by the
Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army. The ideas expressed in this paper
are the authors' and do not necessarily represent the views of the Naval
Postgraduate School, the Department of the Navy or the Department of the Army.
The United States was the dominant member of the coalition forces. This
lead to U.S. concerns, particularly early in Operation Desert Storm, that many
countries benefiting from the coalition's actions were "free riding" (i.e.,
contributing less than their fair share to the coalition forcing the U.S. to
foot the bill). This concern applied to members supplying both military
forces and financial aid. Burden sharing can be a divisive factor in
international political and economic relationships.
This paper will examine burden sharing in Operation Desert Storm. In
particular, it will examine defense alliances models and data from Operation
Desert Storm to see what theoretical and empirical evidence suggests about the
distribution of the defense burden. With the apparent dissolution of the
WARSAW Pact, actions such as Operation Desert Storm may be the most likely
type of future deployment for U.S. forces. * Understanding burden sharing in
this context would help prepare for this possibility.
BURDEN SHARING IN DEFENSE ALLIANCES
The economic theory of alliances is based on public goods theory. A
public good is any good where consumption is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable.
Nonrivalrous consumption means that several individuals can simultaneously
consume a good without affecting the value anyone receives from that good.
Nonexcludability means that it is impossible or prohibitively expensive to
deny access to any consumers, irrespective of their payments for the good.^
^This was reflected in an August 2, 1990 speech by President Bush in Aspen
Colorado and in the Secretary of Defense's annual report. (Cheney, 1991)
^street lights satisfy both criteria of public goods. They are nonrivalrous
because many pedestrians and vehicles can simultaneously consume the light.
They are nonexcludable because it is virtually impossible (or prohibitively
expensive) to deny anyone access to street lighting once it is installed.
Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) were among the first to hypothesize that
defense alliances provide public goods. Based on this hypothesis, they
concluded that defense alliances will provide less than the optimal amount of
defense goods and some countries will bear costs exceeding their relative
share of the total benefits.
Individual countries making independent decisions will provide public
goods until the additional cost of the last unit they provide equals the
benefit they receive from that unit. In this decision, individual countries
ignore the benefits their expenditures provide jto others (called external
benefits). Similarly, each country receives defense benefits from their
allies' defense expenditures (called spill-over benefits; external benefits
provided by one country become spill-over benefits to its allies). Countries
have an incentive to substitute these spill-over benefits for their own
defense expenditures. When countries cannot be excluded from enjoying spill-
over benefits, they have an incentive to "free ride" (i.e., relying on defense
resources provided by other alliance members). External/spill-over benefits
limit the total quantity of the public good provided. This creates
suboptimality (i.e., the incremental cost of additional units of defense is
less than the combined incremental value received by all alliance members).
External and spill-over benefits shift costs to those who place a higher value
on the public good, as determined by preferences and resources. 3
It is important to recognize that all alliance members free ride. The
opportunity to pass some costs to one's allies in part creates the mutual
benefits enjoyed by all alliance members (if an alliance did not provide its
3Disproportionality refers to the distribution of costs and benefits within
the alliance. In particular, disproportionality implies that members with the
highest value for the public good pay a percent of the costs that exceeds
their share of the total benefits. Conversely, members with a low value for
the public good pay a disproportionately small cost share.
members with more defense for a lower cost, members would not voluntarily
participate). Because all alliance members free ride, the burden sharing
debate really concerns perceived equity and the relative extent of free riding
across alliance members. ^ a country becomes dissatisfied if it perceives that
its share of the costs exceed its share of the benefits. This is taken as a
sign that it is free riding less than its allies.
^
Mixed Public and Private Benefits
More recently, authors have questioned whether defense expenditures
provide purely public benefits. Noting that public goods are nonrivalrous and
nonexcludable, Hildebrandt (199 0) emphasized that the benefits of purely
public defense goods are independent of which member supplies the good. In
other words, there are no distinct benefits associated with ownership of
purely public defense goods. If defense goods are deployed in a way that
increases the benefits of the provider, at the expense of the alliance, the
goods contain a private element.
^The burden sharing debate focuses on the ratio of costs and benefits across
alliance members because measuring the extent of free riding is impossible.
Equating the costs/benefit ratio across Alliance members is not necessarily
optimal or equitable. For example, it does not consider ability to pay or
differences in the marginal utility of income or military expenditures. The
problem is further aggravated when the ratio of defense expenditures to GDP is
used as a proxy for the ratio of costs to benefits. Defense expenditures and
GDP are not good proxies for defense benefits and costs. Despite these
caveats, the ratio of costs to benefits will be used to measure equity in this
paper because it is commonly used in political debates. Gates and Terasawa
(1992) discuss equity in defense alliances in more detail.
^There is a distinction between efficiency and equity. Efficiency requires
increasing the total level of defense until the marginal defense cost to any
one alliance member equals the sum of the marginal benefits received by all
alliance members. The distribution of the defense burden across alliance
members is determined by the member's relative costs. For efficiency,
marginal defense costs should be equal for all alliance members. The
conditions for efficiency do not consider equity. If the alliance is
efficient, there is no guarantee that costs will be proportional to benefits.
Considering this characterization, it seems appropriate to distinguish
public from private defense goods by the degree to which the resources are
committed to the alliance. (Gates and Terasawa, 1992) Commitment refers here
to whether the member providing the resource relinquishes effective control
over that resource. Defense goods are fully committed if the provider has
transferred all effective control over the asset to the alliance. This
ensures that the resource will be deployed to best achieve the alliance '
s
objectives. Fully committed resources are purely public goods. Resource are
partially committed if the provider retains some control over the resource.
With partial commitment, the provider can deploy the resource in a way which
benefits the provider at the alliance's expense (e.g., the alliance would have
used the resource differently, ex ante, if it was controlled by the alliance).
Therefore, alliance members are likely to consider the asset at less than it's
full value, decreasing external and spill-over benefits. Finally, the
resource is purely private if the provider retains complete control over the
resource and it's expected deployment is not likely to provide the alliance
any benefit (i.e., there are no external or spill-over benefits). As the
ratio of private to public benefits increases, external/spill-over benefits
decreases and equity increases.
^
Inequities also decrease in commitment based alliance models when long-
term relationships are important. When alliance members are concerned with
maintaining long-term relationships (including defense, political and economic
60ther authors distinguish between public and private defense goods based on
the resource's physical characteristics rather than commitment. (Sandler and
Forbes, 1980; Murdoch and Sandler; 1982, 1984; Sandler, 1988) This
explanation appears inconsistent with Operation Desert Storm where defense
resources appear to have provided public benefits regardless of their physical
characteristics
.
relationships), they may be more cooperative. (Kuenne, 1988; Palmer, 1990)
Cooperation, including bargaining, can increase equity.
BENEFITS FROM OPERATION DESERT STORM
Operation Desert Storm's primary objective was to secure Kuwait's
freedom. Over 30 countries supported this objective. 7 These countries all
benefited in various ways. Some of the primary benefits attributed to
Operation Desert Storm include: preserving national sovereignty, securing the
Middle East supply of oil and increasing regional and international stability.
All countries can simultaneously consume these benefits and it is impossible
to deny any country access once they are secured. Thus, these are public
benefits (they are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable). Different countries may
receive different values, but that is consistent with public goods theory.**
There is one possible exception. The coalition's stated objective was
to secure Kuwait's freedom. However, some critics assert that the U.S. had an
additional objective: to destroy Iraq's military capability. If this was a
U.S. objective, and no other country shared this objective, then the U.S. may
have derived some private benefits from Operation Desert Storm. To the extent
that the U.S. retains control over its own resources (and those provided by
^Afghan Mujahedeen, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan,
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Soviet Union,
Spain, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United
States. (Bowman, 199 0; Defense News, Feb. 4, 1991: 31)
®For example, reconsider street lights. Street lights provide several
benefits. Motorists benefit from safer driving conditions and pedestrians
benefit because street lights make them more visible to motorists and help
deter crime. Thus, street lights provide different benefits to different
consumers. Each consumer attaches different values to these benefits.
Despite differences in valuations, street lights are a public good as long as
the benefits are nonrivalrous and non-excludable.
most other coalition members), it could pursue private objectives at the
expense of the coalition's overall objectives. However, if destroying Iraq's
military capability is the most effective way to achieve the coalition's
objective, then U.S. contributions could still be considered public.
Because the benefits were nonrivalrous and nonexcludable, the resources
supporting Operation Desert Storm were public goods to the extent that they
were committed to the coalition. The commitment based alliance model
predicts that disproportionality is likely if participants make independent,
voluntary contributions. On the other hand, disproportionality may be modest
if alliance members are concerned with maintaining long-term relationships.
It is necessary to compare each country's relative cost and benefits to
examine the extent to which empirical data indicate inequity. Benefits will
be discussed briefly. 9 Costs will be discussed in turn.
National Sovereignty
One obvious benefit is preserving national sovereignty. Kuwait is the
prime beneficiary; Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and
Israel benefit to a lesser degree. However, the national sovereignty benefit
extends beyond the countries directly threatened by Iraq. Operation Desert
Storm may also increase the perceived commitment by large countries to protect
smaller friendly nations, both formal and informal allies. Increasing this
perceived commitment may reduce the necessity for this type of action in the
future. Thus, larger countries acting as world policemen, including the U.S.
'This discussion will not address all potential benefits or weigh their pros
and cons (e.g., is regional stability best obtained by a U.S. led coalition)
It discusses the most commonly cited benefits and their relative values to
different countries.
and some Western European countries, receive an indirect national sovereignty
benefit. 10 Smaller countries that are potential targets of aggressive
neighbors also benefit if increasing the perceived commitment of larger,
friendly nations helps forestall this aggression.
Oil Supply Security
Securing Middle East supplies of oil is another benefit attributed to
Operation Desert Storm. The initial reaction is to claim that the greatest
oil supply security benefit accrues to the countries most reliant on oil from
the Persian Gulf. (U.S. Senate, 1991: 22-24) According to this argument,
Japan, France and the U.K. received a larger relative oil supply security
benefit than the U.S. (See Figure la) Only Germany is less dependent on
Persian Gulf oil.
However, it is inappropriate to associate the value of oil supply
security with reliance on Persian Gulf oil. Oil markets cannot be delineated
by source of supply or demand. The world oil market is an integrated market.
Changes in one source of supply or demand will affect all market participants.
Thus, disruptions in oil supplies from Iraq and Kuwait will have impacts
extending beyond consumers relying on those particular suppliers (though
countries importing oil from Iraq and Kuwait will bear the short run
transactions costs of switching suppliers).
An alternative approach measures the oil supply security benefit by
looking at a country's overall reliance on imported oil. According to this
10President Bush acknowledged this U.S. national sovereignty benefit at a news
conference on March 1, 1991. According to President Bush, victory in the
Persian Gulf reduces the risk that U.S. troops will have to go into battle
someplace else in the future. (Griffith, 1991: 2A)
argument, all oil consumers pay more for oil as world oil prices increase.
This creates an income transfer from oil consumers to producers. Oil imports
cause a loss in national income because income is transferred across
international boundaries. Based on this reasoning, world oil price increases
have a larger impact on net oil importing countries. In this case, France,
Germany, and Japan would all receive a relatively greater oil supply security
benefit than the U.S. (See Figure lb) Conversely, this line of reasoning
implies that net oil exporting countries benefit from increases in world oil
prices. These countries receive a positive income transfer which increases
their national income. Some of the net oil exporters, and their 19 89 exports
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Figure la.
Persian Gulf Oil as a Percent












U.S. U.K. France FRG Japan
Figure lb.
Imported Oil as a Percent
of Total Oil Consumption
aU.S. Senate, 1991: 22.
fortune, 1990: 48-49.
international Monetary Fund (IMF), 1990: 34.
Table 1. 1989 Net Oil Exports (millions of barrels)
Coalition Members Non-Coalition Members
Saudi Arabia 1,363 U.S.S.R. 1,026
United Arab Emirates 500 Iran 823
Qatar 107 Venezuela 382
U.K. 513 Libya 312
Canada 256 Indonesia 249
China 202
Source: IMF, 1990: 48-49.
Unfortunately, the value of the oil supply security benefit is more
complex than indicated by dependence on foreign oil. The most appropriate
measure of this benefit is actually related to the impact that world oil
prices have on current and future GDP. GDP ' s sensitivity to changes in the
world oil prices is measured by the elasticity of GDP with respect to changes
in the world price of oil (referred to here as oil price elasticity) . This
measure is defined as the percentage change in GDP divided by the percentage
change in world oil prices. It is a unit-less number showing the sensitivity
of GDP to changes in world oil prices.
Comparing oil price elasticities will indicate the relative impact of an
increase in oil prices on two different countries. The absolute effect on GDP
depends on both the oil price elasticity and the magnitude of the oil price
change. Both the relative and absolute effects are important in discussing
burden sharing in Operation Desert Storm. The relative effects on GDP
determine the distribution of the security of oil supply benefit. The
absolute effects on GDP determine the significance of this benefit.
Considering oil price elasticity, conventional wisdom may be misleading.
The distribution of the oil supply security benefit may not correspond to a
country's reliance on either Persian Gulf or imported oil. Countries that
have invested in energy efficient manufacturing capabilities may have lower
oil price elasticities. Thus, they may suffer a relatively small decrease in
GDP as oil prices increase, even if they import more of their oil.
10
This may well characterize comparisons between the U.S. and both Japan
and Germany. Japan and Germany have invested heavily in energy efficient
production technologies. Their oil price elasticities may be smaller than in
the U.S. If this is true, the relative security of oil supply benefit may
actually be larger in the U.S. than in either Japan or Germany.
The Appendix to this paper models the impact of a disruption in world
oil supplies on GDP for three hypothetical countries. All three countries
consume two final products, oil and an industrial product produced using oil
as an input. One country, representing the United States, imports a portion
of its domestic oil consumption. The second country, representing Japan or
Germany, imports all of its oil. The third country, representing Kuwait or
Saudi Arabia, produces only oil and imports industrial products from the other
two countries. The model is a general equilibrium model that shows the impact
on GDP for all three countries if oil supplies from the oil exporting country
are cut in half. In this model, the relative impact on GDP in the oil
importing countries depends on the relative oil price elasticities. These
elasticities depend in part on the energy efficiency of the manufacturing
sector.
In the model, energy efficiency in manufacturing is assumed to be higher
for the country importing all of its oil.* 1 If there is enough difference
between energy efficiencies, the oil price elasticity is smaller for the
country importing all of its oil. Thus, its oil supply security benefit would
be smaller than for the country importing only a portion of its oil. As the
^Specific values for energy efficiencies used in the model and the resulting
oil price elasticities are given in the Appendix. This stylized model is
illustrative. It is highly simplified and derives results for hypothetical,
though not implausible, parameter values. The intent is to show that "foreign
oil dependency" can be a poor proxy for evaluating the economic consequences




relative energy efficiency of the oil import-dependent country decreases, its
relative oil price elasticity increases. According to this stylized model,
the relative impact of an oil supply disruption on GDP depends on both energy
efficiency in manufacturing and the level of dependence on imported oil.
Neither one alone predicts the relative impacts on GDP.
Several sources estimate GDP elasticities for the U.S. and Japan. For
example, Rasche and Tatom (1977b) estimated that the U.S. GDP elasticity was
-0.12 for the period between 1949 and 1975. Tatom (1988) estimated that this
elasticity was approximately -0.055 between 19.55 and 1986. Differences
between the two estimates were attributed to data revisions and omission of a
productivity growth shift term in the earlier study. Using the same approach
as Rasche and Tatom (1977b), Takenaka (1990) estimated that the GDP elasticity
was -0.1062 for the U.S. and -0.119 for Japan between 1965 and 1978. Takenaka
found that this elasticity fell in Japan to between -0.03 and -0.052 for the
period between 1981 and 1986, presumably due to Japan's investment in energy
saving capital. Finally, Rasche and Tatom (1977a) hypothesize that the oil
price elasticity should approximately equal the share of energy consumption in
GDP. In 1989, these shares were approximately 0.048 for the U.S., 0.0118 for
Japan, and 0.027 for Germany. (IMF, 199 0: 34)
Thus, evidence indicates that the elasticity of GDP with respect to
changes in world oil prices may be higher in the U.S. than in Japan and
Germany. Consequently, the relative security of oil supply benefit may be
lower in these countries than in the U.S.
The overall significance of the security of oil supply benefit depends
on both the oil price elasticity and the magnitude of the change in world oil
prices. It is clear that Iraq wanted to raise world oil prices. In fact, an
oil price dispute was one source of tension between Iraq and Kuwait. In early
12
1990, Iraq lobbied OPEC to raise oil prices to $20/barrel. (Farouk-Sluglett
and Sluglett, 1990) This request was denied and oil prices fell to as low as
$14/barrel. Iraq alleged that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
depressed world oil prices by exceeding their OPEC sanctioned production
quotas. Iraq claimed Kuwait and the UAE were involved in a Washington
encouraged international conspiracy. The conspiracy's alleged intent was to
economically destroy Iraq and diminish it's regional power; equivalent to war
by economic means. (Nonneman, 1990: 10; Stork and Lesch, 1990: 18). On July
27, 1990, OPEC set a target price of $21 /barrel- and Kuwait and the United Arab
Emirates agreed to adhere to their quotas. (Middle East Report, 1991: 90)
However, Iraq charged that Kuwait continued to exceed its quota, leading to
Iraq's August 2nd invasion.
Despite this rhetoric, there are reasons to believe that increases in
world oil prices would be temporary and modest, even if Iraq retained
possession of Kuwait and annexed the remaining GCC states. If Iraq controlled
most Persian Gulf oil, it would likely raise oil prices above $20/barrel.
However, oil price increases elicit both a supply and demand response. On the
supply side, higher oil prices would encourage other oil producers to increase
output in the short run. OPEC ' s inability to raise oil prices to their target
levels since the early 1980 's indicates jfhe strength of this incentive. In
fact, world oil supplies quickly replaced the oil production lost with the
embargo on Iraq and Kuwait (Figure 2). In the long run, higher oil prices
would encourage exploration for new reserves and expansion of existing oil
production facilities (e.g., in the USSR). These supply side responses would
put downward pressure on world oil prices.
On the demand side, higher oil prices encourage consumers to conserve
oil and look for alternative energy sources (e.g., natural gas). In addition,
13
world GDP falls, further reducing oil demand. Oil price increases can
actually reduce oil revenues if the quantity demanded falls sufficiently.
Henderson (1990) estimates that the revenue maximizing price of oil is
approximately $27/barrel. With competition between suppliers, it is unlikely
Iraq could sustain oil prices at this level. Considering both the supply and
demand responses, it is unlikely that the security of oil supply benefit would
be significant over an extended period of time. More than likely, it would be
modest even in the short run.



























Production changes as a % of July 1991 world total






Aug-90 Sep-90 Oct-9 Nov-9 Dec-90
H Iraq & Kuwait P Others
Saudi Arabia World Total
Source: International Energy Administration (EIA) , Department of Energy
(DOE), International Petroleum Statistics.
Regional and International Stability
Increasing Persian Gulf stability is another alleged benefit.
Instability in the region can be attributed to several factors, including:
growing dissatisfaction with the region's inequitable oil wealth distribution,
14
increasing frustration over the Palestinian issue, mounting pressure to make
governments more democratic, and the growing influence of fundamentalist
religious groups. (Andoni, 1990a, 1990b; Graz, 1990; Nonneman, 1990; Stork
and Lesch, 1990; Lesch, 1991, Stork and Wenger, 1991) Adding to these
instabilities, leaders in several countries wanted to establish themselves as
the dominant regional power so they could introduce resolutions that best
served their interests. Prior to Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, the primary
contenders to the claim of regional hegemon included Iraq, Iran, and Egypt.
The benefits of the coalition's actions vary widely across nations,
depending on each nation's perception of the desired regional order and their
view of foreign (particularly western) intervention. The Gulf States and
Israel probably received the greatest value from this benefit. They have
relatively close ties with the U.S. and prefer to maintain the status quo. 12
Egypt and Syria probably received moderate benefits. Both countries have ties
to the GCC and the U.S. (though Syria's ties are fairly recent and more
tenuous). Both also have strained relations with Iraq. While they might
prefer resolving this issue regionally, they are probably less opposed than
some to western participation. (Butt, 1990; Saleh, 1990, Lesch, 1991)
On the other hand, some countries probably prefer Iraq's vision of
regional stability to the coalition's vision, including countries with
particularly strong ties to Iraq, those desiring more radical changes in the
1
^After the 1979 Iranian revolution, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and
the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. and the GCC established military ties. Regional
sensitivities precluded overt military ties, but the U.S. received limited
permission to use military facilities in Bahrain, Oman and Egypt. More
importantly, Saudi Arabia built a $50 billion Gulf-wide air defense system to
U.S. and NATO specifications. This system included Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS) planes and several bases, some designed by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, stocked with fuel, parts and munitions. The U.S.
intended to provide front-line forces in any crises, after a public invitation
from the area's ruling families. (Stork and Wenger, 1991)
15
status quo and those harboring strong opposition to a western presence in the
region (e.g., Jordan, the PLO, and Iran). Many of these countries seemingly
supported Iraq, either tacitly or overtly. Unfortunately, Operation Desert
Storm's regional stability benefit is virtually impossible to quantify.
For reference, Table 2 summarizes the primary benefits from Operation
Desert Storm. These benefits cannot be accurately quantified, so the major
participants in Operation Desert Storm have been subjectively categorized into
high, medium and low value groups for each benefit. Unfortunately, different
benefits do not have comparable values.
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COALITION CONTRIBUTIONS TO OPERATION DESERT STORM
Burden sharing relates contributions to benefits for countries
participating in Operation Desert Storm. Thus, it is important to identify
each country's contribution to the coalition. Over 30 countries contributed
to the operation. The contributions varied widely in content and magnitude.
Some members contributed resources (manpower, aircraft, ships, armed vehicles,
etc.). Others contributed cash and in-kind assistance to help cover U.S.
costs and to aid countries suffering adverse impacts from the conflict and the
16
embargo on Iraq. Finally, some countries contributed by observing the
economic embargo on Iraq. Each of these contributions will be discussed. 13
Defense Resource Contributions
Figure 3 shows the manpower contributed by the significant participants
in Operation Desert Storm. 14 The U.S. contributed about 70% of the
coalition's manpower and other military resources. OMB (1991) estimated that
the incremental cost of these resources would .exceed $61 Billion (14% for
transportation, 30% for personnel and personnel support, 41% for operating
support and fuel, and 15% for investment and construction). Other countries
also incurred costs for the military resources they provided to Operation
Desert Storm. Assuming similar per capita expenses, costs can be estimated
for countries contributing manpower. (Table 3) These estimates assume that
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt and Syria don't incur transportation or investment
and military construction costs.
"
13There are several other important contributions that are not considered
here. For example, Turkey provided the U.S. access to Turkish air fields and
amassed troops along the Turkey/Iraqi boarder, Germany sent 5 mine sweepers to
the eastern Mediterranean to replace relocated NATO forces and Egypt and Syria
absorbed domestic political costs because there was strong public sentiment
against committing troops. (Bowman, 1991; Abdalla, 1991; Lesch, 1991; Butt,
1990) These contributions are impossible to quantify.
14In this discussion, manpower will be used as a proxy for all resource
contributions. In general, relative contributions of aircraft, ships, armored
vehicles, etc. are similar in magnitude to the relative manpower
contributions. Furthermore, other resources are more difficult to summarize
because of differences in physical characteristics (e.g., comparing numbers of
ships assumes that a U.S. aircraft carrier is equivalent to a U.K. guided
missile frigate or destroyer). For ease of presentation, this analysis will
only consider manpower contributions. Similar results would pertain to other
resource contributions. For a more complete description of the resources
provided by other coalition members see Bowman (1990).
"If U.S. resources were used more intensely than those contributed by other
countries, these estimates will overstate the actual incremental cost incurred
by other countries. This is supported by preliminary incremental cost
estimates for the U.K ($2.5B) and France ($1.2B). (deBriganti, 1991)
17







































Sources: Bowman, 1990; Defense News, 1991; National Journal, 1991; U.S.
Congress, Senate, 1991. All data in these references are not comparable
TABLE 3: Estimated Incremental Defense Costs of
Operation Desert Storm (S Billions)
Country U.S.
Saudi
Arabia Kuwait Egypt Syria U.K. France
Cost ($B) 61 5.6 0.6 2.6 1.7 4.9 2.4
Note: Based on U.S. incremental defense costs (OMB, 1991). Assumes similar
per capita personnel and operations costs as estimated for the U.S. for all
countries. Assumes similar per capita transportation and investment costs for
the U.K and France.
Cash, In-Kind and Aid Contributions
In addition to military resources, some countries pledged cash and in-
kind assistance to the coalition. Figure 4 shows the cash and in-kind
18
contributions to the U.S. for participants in Operation Desert Storm.
*
6
Several countries also provided aid to the "front-line states" (Turkey, Jordan
and Egypt) and other countries affected by the economic embargo on Iraq. This
aid is part of a country's contribution to Operation Desert Storm. *' Figure 5
summarizes these contributions for selected coalition participants.























l 6Figure 3 shows each country's pledge to the U.S. (OMB, 1991) These pledges
total $53,958M. As of November 15, 1991, $50,487M had been paid. The $3,471M
outstanding pledges are being paid according to a schedule established by the
U.S. and the respective foreign governments. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
accounted for over $3,2 00M of the outstanding pledges. OMB (1991) provides a
description of the in-kind assistance provided by each country. In addition,
Japan provided $700M to the U.K. and France. Korea also provided small
contributions to the U.K. and France. (Conahan, 1991)
*
"^There are additional contributions that should be included. Consider Egypt.
The U.S. has forgiven $7 billion in military debts, the Gulf states have
forgiven $7 to $9 billion in debts and Egypt has received close to $10 billion
in additional loans (withheld prior to August 2, 1990). (Abdalla, 1991;
Parker, 1991) This aid involves direct benefits and costs, but it is
difficult to value. For example, the value of debt forgiveness must be
discounted by the probability of default and for the time value of the
foregone future payments. Similarly, the cost of loans must consider the
opportunity coat of the money loaned and the probability of default. For
these reasons, only direct cash grants are included in this analysis.
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Figure 5: Aid To Front Line and Other States
5,000
L_J Aid to Front Line States
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Source: Conahan (1991).
Costs of the Economic Embargo Against Iraq
Finally, some countries contributed to the coalition by observing the
economic embargo against Iraq. For example, Turkey lost revenues associated
with Iraq's oil pipeline through Turkey. Egypt lost foreign remittances from
workers in Gulf countries, Suez Canal tolls, proceeds from exports to Iraq and
Kuwait and tourism revenues. In total, Egypt's losses were estimated at over
$3 billion. (Abdalla, 1991; Parker, 1991) Syria, Jordan, Pakistan and
several other countries incurred similar costs.
Another cost of the Iraqi embargo involves higher oil prices. The short
run increase in world oil prices between August 1990 and January 1991 was more
severe than the price increases that would have occurred if Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait had been unchallenged. After the embargo on oil from Iraq and Kuwait,
oil prices increased due to the combined effects of reduced supply and
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speculative demand. It is unlikely that Iraq would have removed all of this
oil from the world oil market, so the supply impact would have been partially
mitigated. The presence of some Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil exports may also have
reduced speculative demand. Thus, coalition intervention actually increased
short run oil prices.
As discussed earlier, higher oil prices cause an income transfer from
oil importing to oil exporting countries and cause a reduction in GDP. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the effect on 199 GDP if oil
prices increased at a 40% annual rate beginning in August 1990. Oil prices
averaged $26/barrel in the later part of 1990 in their base case. A 40%
annual increase, beginning in August 1990, would increase oil prices by
approximately $4/barrel in 1990. Table 5 summarizes the simulation results
for the U.S., Japan, Germany, France, the U.K. and all industrialized
countries as a group. If the IMF's base case reflects world oil prices with
the coalition's intervention and the 40% price increase scenario reflects oil
prices with the embargo, the estimates in Table 4 measure the expected impact
on 1990 GDP of the coalition's embargo. Actual oil prices increased faster
than the IMF high oil price scenario between August 1990 and mid-January 1991,
exceeding $40/barrel in October 1990. Thus, Table 4 likely understates the
cost burden of the embargo on Iraqi oilw
While GDP in oil importing countries decreased because of the Iraqi oil
embargo, oil exporting countries received an increase in oil revenues. In
particular, both oil prices and output increased as other producers expanded
production to replace the embargoed oil. As a result, both Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) received windfall gains. These were at least
partially offset by both decreases in GDP due to higher world oil prices and
the costs incurred to expand oil production. Estimates are not available for
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the impact of higher oil prices on GDP in Saudi Arabia and the UAE . Saudi
Arabia claims to have spent $4B to expand oil production. The net gain for
both countries is shown in Table 5.
Table 4. Effects of a 40 Percent Rise in World Oil Prices
U.S. Japan Germany France U.K. Industrial
Countries
Baseline Real GDP
Growth Rate 3 1.3 5.1 3.9 3.1 1.4 2.6
Modified Real GDP
Growth Rate 3 1.1 4.9 3.6 2.9 1.2 2.4
% Change in
Real GDP3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3
-0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Change in Real
GDP (B 1990$) b -10.5 -6.0 -3.8 -2.0 -1.7 N/A
aIMF (October 1990), World Economic Outlook, Washington, D.C., International
Monetary Fund: 35, 113.
bBased on 1989 GDP data, see International Institute for Strategic Studies
(IISS), 1990. 1989 GDP data was escalated to 1990 values using IMF real GDP
growth rates (IMF, Oct. 1990: 113).
Table 5: Net Windfall Oil Profits (SBillions)
Country Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates
Net Windfall Profit 15.0 5.2
Source: Hinkley (1991).
For reference, Figure 6 combines the costs of defense resources, cash
and in-kind contributions, aid to front-line and other states, and the
indirect costs (windfall profits) of the embargo on Iraqi oil. Recalling the
measurement problems associated with these estimates and that some important
contributions have not been considered, Figure 6 gives a preliminary estimate
of the total incremental cost of Operation Desert Storm.
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MEASURING EQUITY IN DEFENSE ALLIANCES
The preceding discussion indicates that benefits and contributions vary
across coalition members in both type and magnitude. Empirically measuring
disproportionality in Operation Desert Storm requires specifying the diverse
costs and benefits in common units so their relative values can be compared
across coalition members. This introduces significant measurement problems,
as discussed above.
Quantitative Equity Measures
The U.S. Senate Budget Committee compared each county's contribution to
the coalition's total manpower with their dependence on Persian Gulf imports
to assess the burden distribution in Operation Desert Storm. (U.S. Senate,
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1991) Figure 7 reconstructs this comparison. According to this comparison,
the U.S. is bearing a disproportionately large burden.
Figure 7 : Military Manpower Contributions Versus
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However, there are several problems with this measure. The manpower
proxy for contributions ignores other types of defense resources and all
financial contributions. Thus, it is biased against Japan and Germany who
have made financial contributions. Similarly, the benefit proxy incorrectly
measures the oil supply security benefit and ignores all other benefits. For
example, the benefits realized by the GCC states, Egypt and Syria can not be
captured by this measure.
Defense expenditures and GDP have frequently been used as proxies for
defense costs and benefits, respectively. Figure 8 shows defense expenditures
as a percent of GDP for the major participants in Operation Desert Storm.
This figure uses defense expenditure data from Figure 6. GDP data is from the
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International Institute for strategic studies (IISS, 1990). This index
indicates that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have the highest ratio of costs to
benefits. They are bearing a disproportionately large burden, according to





































Incremental Expenditures for Operation Desert Storm
as a percent of GDP
87.91
15.49
1.26 0.65 0.96 0.78 0.46
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Arabia
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Using GDP as a proxy for defense benefits implies that the objective of
defense is to protect a nation's income. However, Operation Desert Storm had
several other direct and indirect benefits, as discussed previously.
Furthermore, the value of these benefits depends in part on the level of the
perceived threat. 1* Defense expenditures become more valuable as the
* 8Perceived threat in this case measures each country's opinion of whether the
Iraqi annexation of Kuwait threatened that country's national sovereignty,
regional and international stability, and oil supply security.
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perceived threat increases. GDP does not reflect the range of benefits or
perceived threat.
Considering the wide range of benefits and threat perceptions, it would
not be surprising to observe two nations contributing different amounts to
Operation Desert Storm even though they have identical GDPs. This result
could even occur if defense burdens were shared equitably. GDP serves as a
proxy for defense benefits only if all other factors are identical for all
alliance members. If this ceteris paribus assumption is violated, the ratio
of defense expenditures to GDP cannot measure equitably. 1 ^
Measurement problems also arise in using defense expenditures as proxies
for contributions to the coalition. (Knorr, 1985) Most significantly, in the
case of Operation Desert Storm, troop costs are impossible to estimate when
troops are at risk. 2 Furthermore, cost estimates must measure the marginal
opportunity cost of the troops and equipment deployed in Operation Desert
Storm. Because marginal costs are hard to estimate, budgetary costs are
frequently used.^1 Finally, expenditure data does not consider differences in
procurement efficiencies or defense capabilities.
Another common alternative is to measure the actual defense resources
provided (e.g., manpower, ships, aircraft, tanks, etc.). (NATO Defence
Planning Committee, 1988; Cooper and Zycher, 1989; U.S. Secretary of Defense,
*^The ratio of GDP to defense expenditures was first used by Olson and
Zeckhauser (1966). They appropriately hypothesized that, all other things
equal, there will be a significant positive correlation between defense
expenditures and a nation's GDP. The ceteris paribus assumption has not been
explicitly acknowledged in the succeeding studies using this measure.
2°Troops at risk and expected casualties are important measures of a country's
contribution. Before the end of a conflict, the number of actual casualties
is uncertain. A country's commitment to the coalition's objectives is
measured by it's expected casualties. If actual casualties are lighter than
expected, it reduces the total cost the country actually pays. It does not
reduce the country's commitment to the coalition.
21For further discussion see Hinkley (1991) and Johnson (1991).
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1990) Unfortunately, capability related measures have many shortcomings.
First, this data does not relate contributions to benefits. Second, it is
impossible to combine data on several different resources into a single
contribution index. Finally, defense capabilities do not capture the real
military value of an ally's contribution. Military value is the joint product
of several factors, including: quantity of troops and equipment; capability
and condition of military equipment; capability to support and re-supply; and
troop training, leadership and morale. (Knorr, 1985) Defense capabilities
only measure the first of these factors.
Subjective Equity Assessments
Because of the measurement problems described above, it is impossible to
calculate a single quantitative index to compare equity across coalition
members. Instead, general impressions can be drawn by qualitatively comparing
the coalition members' relative contributions and benefits.
Considering the national sovereignty, oil supply security and regional
stability benefits attributed to Operation Desert Storm (recall Table 3), it
appears that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states gained the most
from the coalition's actions. They received the greatest national sovereignty
and regional stability benefits. These are the most significant benefits.
Japan and Germany probably received the smallest benefits. At best, the
security of oil supply benefit is modest in the short run and probably
negligible in the long run. Furthermore, Japan's and Germany's indirect
national sovereignty benefits are also modest because of their current
constitutional limits on military actions beyond their boarders (i.e., limits
on their role as world policeman)
.
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Finally, the U.S. probably received a greater indirect national
sovereignty benefit than the U.K. or France. The U.S. places a greater
emphasis on its role as world policeman (and/or perceives a greater threat to
its view of the appropriate world order) and has closer ties to Israel. The
U.S., U.K. and France probably received similar relative values from the other
benefits. Thus, the U.S. received greater benefits than either the U.K. or
France
.
Comparing this ranking of beneficiaries with their relative financial
contributions (recall Figure 8), two conclusions become evident: the GCC
states, with the exception of Kuwait, appear to have born a disproportionately
small share of the Operation Desert Storm burden; Japan and Germany appear to
have born a disproportionately large share of the burden. Regarding the GCC
states, Saudi Arabia contributed all of its military forces and approximately
25% of its 1989 GDP in cash, in-kind assistance and foreign aide. However,
Saudi Arabia also receive windfall oil revenues that offset a significant
portion of this financial burden. The situation is worse for the other GCC
members. These countries did not directly contribute military forces. ^2
Furthermore, the UAE only contributed 14% of its 1989 GDP; the remaining GCC
states (Bahrain, Oman and Qatar) did not pledge any of their combined $17. 7B
1989 GDP. All of these countries have received windfall oil profits. If
these countries had all contributed 25% of their 1989 GDP, as did Saudi
2
^While none of these countries directly provided troops, the Gulf Cooperation
Council maintained a combined force of 10,000 troops from Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. This force was
stationed in northern Saudi Arabia, along with approximately 10,000 Kuwaiti
soldiers that escaped following Iraq's invasion. (Bowman, 1991) The costs of
these troops have not been estimated in this analysis.
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Arabia, their combined contribution would have increased by over $7B. Much of
this cost would still be offset by windfall oil profits.
^
3
At the other extreme, Japan and Germany seem to have made financial
contributions exceeding their share of the benefits. It appears that their
primary benefit was maintaining good relationships with the U.S. In
particular, both Japan and Germany significantly increased their contributions
shortly after the war began. These additional pledges appeared to result in
large part from intense U.S. lobbying (Walsh, 1991).
^
4 With bargaining,
countries valuing the public good more highly .{.i.e. , the U.S.) can encourage
other countries to increase their share of the burden. (Though there might
also have been an increase in the perceived threat as the war approached and
finally became reality.)
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The benefits from Operation Desert Storm include national sovereignty,
regional and international stability and oil supply security. These benefits
are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. Therefore, they are public benefits and
resources committed to the coalition are public goods. Public goods theory
predicts that coalition members will contribute unequally, if contributions
are voluntary and independently determined (i.e., no bargaining). Countries
*~At first glance, Saudi Arabia's higher relative contribution appears
justified because they were most directly threatened by further Iraqi
aggression. However, the threat may not have been significantly lower for the
other GCC states, particularly the United Arab Emirates. Iraq had grouped the
United Arab Emirates with Kuwait in its accusations of excess oil production.
Considering this, and the geographic location and military power of these
countries, it is not unreasonable to conclude that their national sovereignty
benefit was similar to that received by Saudi Arabia
2^In Germany's case, the external pressure to contribute was particularly
intense, in part because of Germany's link to Iraq's chemical and biological
weapons capabilities. (Hippler, 1991; Walsh, 1991)
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placing the highest value on the public good (as indicated by both preferences
and ability to pay) would bear a share of the total costs that exceeds their
share of the total benefits. Countries with a lower value for the public good
bear a lower share of costs relative to benefits. In fact, some countries may
not contribute at all (i.e., the privileged group). Inequities may be reduced
through bargaining if countries are concerned about maintaining long run
mutual relationships.
Data from Operation Desert Storm was examined to find evidence of
inequities by comparing the ratio of costs to benefits for each coalition
member. Each country's appraisal of the benefits depends on both the
benefits' value and the country's threat perception. Similarly, contributions
are difficult to quantify, particularly where lives are at risk. Measurement
problems make it impossible to construct a single quantitative equity index.
Unfortunately, many measures have been proposed. These measures indicate
different balances between costs and benefits across countries. Some may show
the U.S. bearing a disproportionately large burden, others may show a
disproportionately small U.S. burden. In many cases, they may be selected
to demonstrate a particular political viewpoint (e.g., Senate, 1991).
Unfortunately, measurement problems make it impossible to construct an
objective disproportionality index that is universally accepted.
Subjective assessments can be used in the absence of objective
quantitative indices. Subjective assessments indicate that the small GCC
members (i.e., United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar), and Saudi
Arabia to a lesser extent, may have borne a disproportionately small share of
the burden. Considering the U.S.'s relative size and announced intention to
repel Iraq whatever the cost, this result is consistent with public goods
theory without cooperation. Conversely, Japan and Germany appear to have
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borne a share of the burden that exceeded their share of the benefits. This
was probably in response to intense lobbying (bargaining) by the United
States. This result is consistent with public goods theory where long-term
relationships (cooperation) are important.
Recognizing that it is impossible to measure ex post equity should re-
focus the burden sharing debate from outcomes to processes. If we can't
measure outcomes to determine equity, we must establish a fair process. If
everyone agrees that the process is fair, measuring the outcome becomes
unnecessary. For example, the firemen at a local fire station play
basketball, ping pong and other competitive games to determine who washes the
dishes each day. Because they agree the process is fair, they don't have to
track how many times each individual washes the dishes.
As illustrated with Japan and Germany in Operation Desert Storm,
contributions can be increased through bargaining. If coalition members value
continuing military, political or economic relationships, long run
considerations may lead to short run concessions. (Kuenne, 1988; Palmer,
1990) Future research could consider alternative bargaining strategies to
find those that create more equitable short run outcomes while maintaining
long-run relationships. If the U.S. exploits its bargaining power, it may
decrease short run burdens but hurt long run relationships.
Alternatives to bargaining might include matching grants (i.e., the U.S.
offers to double the resources contributed by all other coalition members) or
extensive networks of formal alliances with carefully specified mechanisms to
determine each member's contributions for various contingencies. Different
processes have different implications for equity and for the responsibilities
and restrictions placed on the U.S. Past attention focused on the NATO/WARSAW
Pact confrontation, where U.S. participation was governed by NATO agreements.
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Future engagements like Operation Desert Storm are probably more likely than a
NATO/WARSAW Pact conflict. There are no agreements between the U.S. and it's
allies for these operations. Thus, it is important to establish a procedure,





This Appendix uses a simple 3-country general-equilibrium model to
examine the possible effects of reductions in OPEC oil production capacity on
world oil prices and on GDP in industrialized countries. In this stylized
framework, Country 1 (e.g., the U.S.) produces both oil (denoted X), and
industrial goods (denoted Y) . Country 2 (e.g., Japan) only produces
industrial goods. Country 3 (e.g., Saudi Arabia or Kuwait) only produces oil.
Country 2 relies 100% on foreign oil while Country 1 uses both domestic and
imported oil.
Conventional wisdom holds that reductions in oil supplies and the
resulting rise in world oil prices will have a more adverse impact on Country
2's economy than that of Country 1. Unfortunately, "foreign oil dependence"
is a poor proxy for evaluating the economic consequences of oil supply
disruptions. In fact, the relative international competitiveness for
countries relying more heavily on imported oil can actually increase as world
oil prices increase if they have more energy efficient manufacturing
capabilities. Energy efficiency can offset the impact on GDP of heavier
dependence on foreign oil. The oil price elasticity of GDP, which measures
the percentage change in GDP with respect to the percentage change in oil
prices, is the appropriate index for measuring the economic impact of higher
world oil prices. The oil price elasticity of GDP incorporates both energy
efficiency and foreign oil dependency.
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The Model
This analysis uses a general equilibrium model where countries maximize
their utility subject to a budget constraint (the country's GDP). Production
involves two final goods, industrial goods and oil. Oil is the only input in
industrial production; industrial goods are the only input in oil production.
Thus, both oil and industrial goods are inputs and final products. Both goods
are sold in world markets. All countries face the same world prices
(transportation is costless).
Country i's utility is given by a Cobb-Douglas utility function:
Ui = U(Xi, Yi) = Xiai Yibi (i=l,2,3).
ai and b^ are positive constants. X^ denotes Country i's consumption of oil
as a final product and Y^ represents its consumption of final industrial
goods
.
Country i's production of oil is given by:
Ri = f(Wi) = Ti Wis i (i = 1, 3).
Ti and s^ are positive constants ( 0< s^ <1). Wj_ denotes the amount of
industrial goods used in oil production.
Finally, Country i's production of industrial goods is given by:
Qi = 9(Zi) = Gi Zic i (i = 1, 2).
Gi and c^ are positive constants (0 < Cj. < 1) and Z^ denotes amount of
oil used in producing industrial goods. If Country 2's production capacity is
more energy efficient than Country I's, either cj > C2, Ti >T2, or both.
Producers are assumed to maximize profits in both oil and industrial
production. Profits are given by:
n(Ri) = Px Ri - Py wi (i = 1, 3);
ri(Qi) = Py Qi - Px Zi (i = 1,2).
GDP is the sum of the relevant profits:
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GDPi = ri(Ri) + ri(Qi) (i = 1, 2, 3)
Countries are assumed to maximize utility subject to their budget (GDP)
constraint.
Max Ui = Xiai Yibi
s.t. Bi - Px Xi - Py Yi = where Bi= GDPi.
For equilibrium, supply and demand must be equal in both the oil and
industrial products markets. This is given by:
Rl + R3 = (Xi + X2 + X 3 ) + (Z 2 + Z 2 ) (1)
Ql + Q2 = (Yi + Y2 + Y 3 ) + (Wi + W^ (2)
Equilibrium Solution
To solve for equilibrium in this model, we can find the profit
maximizing conditions for oil and industrial production and the utility
maximizing conditions for the final products market for each country. These
profit and utility maximizing conditions can be expressed in terms of known
parameters and the equilibrium prices of the final products. These
relationships can be combined with equilibrium conditions for the oil and
industrial markets to find the equilibrium prices of oil and industrial goods,
Given these prices, we can find specific values for the quantity of oil and
industrial goods produced and consumed In each country, and the resulting GDP,
From the first order conditions for profit maximization in the oil-
sector, we have:
Wi = F(P) = (Px Ti Si/ZPy) 1^ 1
-3!^'
Ri = F(P) = Ti (Px Ti 3i//Py )
3 i / ( 1
- sO (for i = 1, 3)
From the first order conditions for profit maximization in the
industrial-sector, we have:
Zi = F(P) = (Py Gi Ci/Px) 1 /* 1
- !)'-
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Qi = F(P) = Gi (Py Gi Ci/Px ) ci/ < 1
-Ci) (for i = 1, 2).
From the first order conditions for utility maximization subject to the
Country's budget constraint, we have:
Xi = F(PX ) = (B± a±/ Px ki),
Yi = F(PY ) = (Bi bi/ PY ki) (for i = 1, 2, 3)
where ki = (aj. + bi)
.
Assume that good Y is the numeraire (i.e., Py = 1 and Px = P). P will
adjust to ensure equilibrium in both the oil and industrial goods markets.
Because there are only two goods in the economy, Walras Law states that
equilibrium in one market ensures equilibrium in other market. Thus, the
equilibrium price, Pe , can be derived by finding the price that equates total
supply and demand in either the oil or industrial goods markets. In other
words, Pe can be found by using the profit and utility maximizing conditions
from above to solve
:
Rl + R3 = (Xi + X2 + X3 ) + (Zi + Z 2 ) = F(Pe )
Given equilibrium prices, Pe , specific values can be found for Rj_, Qi, Xi, Yi,
Wj., Zi, Il(Ri)# ri(Qi)» u i» and GDP i-
In this model, the oil price elasticity of GDP is determined by Ci and
Si. Recall that GDPi = I"I<Ri) + Il(Qi) = (Px pi - py wi) + ( py Qi - px Zi) .
Substituting the equilibrium expressions for Ri, Wi, Qi and Zi into this
expression and computing elasticity as (dGDPi/dPx ) (Px/GDPi) yields:
ni( px) = [1/(1 " si)] ri(Rl)/GDPi + [Ci/(Ci - 1)] ri(Ql)/GDPi
Tl2(Px) = c 2 /(c 2 - 1)
Tl3(Px) = 1/(1 - S 3 )
Thus, in Country 1, the oil price elasticity balances the impacts of higher
oil prices on both oil and industrial production. In Countries 2 and 3, with
their specialized economies, the oil price elasticity depends completely on
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the impact of higher oil prices on industrial production and oil production,
respectively.
Simulation Results
The model was used to examine the impact of a 50% reduction in Country
3's oil production on GDP in Countries 1 and 2. Conventional wisdom seems to
indicate that "foreign oil dependence" is a good proxy for measuring the
relative economic impact of oil price increases across industrialized
countries. This exercise was designed to caution against blindly using this
proxy by showing that the decrease in Country '2 ' s GDP can be greater than,
equal to, or less than the decrease in Country l's GDP, even though Country 2
is more reliant on imported oil than Country 1. Thus, "foreign oil
dependence" is not always a good proxy for measuring the economic impact of
oil supply disruptions. The oil price elasticity of GDP is a more appropriate
measure
.
Oil production is endogenously determined in this model. From above,
Country 3's oil production function is R3 = T3 W3 S3. In equilibrium, R3 =
T 3( px T 3 S3) s 3 /'( 1
~ s 3>
, so Country 3's oil production can be reduced by
decreasing T3 (recall < Sj_ < 1). This is equivalent to an increase in the
marginal cost of producing oil in Country 3. This might occur if, for
example, some of country 3's oil wells were destroyed.
Parameter values for each of three scenarios are shown in Table Al . All
parameter values are shown for scenario 1. Scenarios 2 and 3 only show those
parameter values that have changed from scenario 1. The simulation results
for each scenario are shown in Table A2 . In scenario 1, the percentage
decrease in GDP is larger in Country 1. In scenario 2, the percentage
decrease in GDP is the same in both countries. Finally, in scenario 3, the
percentage decrease in GDP is larger in Country 2. This final scenario
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corresponds to the conventional wisdom that the effect of oil price increases
are greater for countries more dependent on foreign oil.
Table 1A: Parameter Values
All Scenarios Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3






1 .20 .70 8.0 .70 1 2.0 .60 2.0 .60
2 .20 .70 1 5.0 .06 3.75 .30
3 .20 .70 10.0 .70 1
Table IB: Simulation Results
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Country 1 Country 2 Country 1 Country 2 Country 1 Country 2
Oil Price













36 100 29 100 7 100
Change in Oil




-16 -1 -16 -5 -15 -15
Reduction in
GDP (%) -5 .6 -0.7 -4 .6 -4.6 -1 .6 -15 .5
Reduction in
Utility (%) -7 -3 -6 -6 -4 -16
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